Relations in British idealism by Bonino, Guido
RELATIONS
Ontology and Philosophy of Religion 








Book series: Philosophy n. ???
© MIM Edizioni Srl
P.I. C.F. 02419370305
This book is published with the subsidy of Scuola di Dottorato in Scienze Umane – 
Università degli Studi di Verona. 
guido Bonino
1.  
RELATIONS IN BRITISH IDEALISM
1. The troubled status of relations
Ontology and logic long regarded relations with some reservation or 
unease. This was the case for several reasons: (i) it partly depended on 
Aristotelian metaphysical legacy; (ii) partly on technical difficulties in 
their logical treatment; (iii) and partly on the empiricist/associationist 
view according to which relations are the product of the mind.
As regards (i). In the framework of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, 
relations are a non-substantial category, and therefore have a lower 
ontological status – so to speak – than substances. But relations seem to 
have an even lower ontological status than other non-substantial categories, 
such as quality. Sure enough, according to Aristotle the universal quality 
whiteness may in a sense be considered to be in a substance, and insofar 
as it is in a substance, it partakes – at least to some degree – in the being 
of the substance itself. Relations are less easily localizable in space, and 
their connection with substances is consequently weaker, so that their 
ontological status will be very low. Relations are, therefore, “the least 
real” of categories (see Met. 1088a20-22, 29-34).
As regards (ii). Traditional (syllogistic) logic encountered difficulties 
in dealing with all types of inferences involving both nested quantifiers 
and relations. Special cases could be taken care of by means of 
different maneuvers (such as the theory of suppositio), but no general 
solution seemed to be available. The problem could be swept under the 
carpet, so the speak, through the assertion that relations can ultimately 
be reduced to properties, since a first-order sentence containing only 
monadic predicates can always be reformulated as a sentence free of 
nested quantifiers, and can thus be treated successfully by traditional 
logic. This circumstance undoubtedly enticed many philosophers and 
logicians to ignore relations altogether.
Whereas factors (i) and (ii) operated through almost the whole 
history of philosophy, factor (iii) operated in a more limited context, 
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yet relevant for British idealism – as we shall see. According to 
Locke, relations are ‘not contained in the real existence of things, but 
[are] something extraneous and superinduced’ (An Essay concerning 
Human Understanding, 4th ed., 1700, II, xxv, 8); they have ‘no other 
reality but what they have in the minds of men’ (II, xxx, 4): among 
mind’s activities is that of ‘bringing together two ideas, whether simple 
or complex, setting them side by side so as to see them both at once, 
without uniting them into one; this is how the mind gets all its ideas of 
relations’ (II, xii, 1). It seems that for Locke relations come to coincide 
with ideas of relations. This is the reason for which in the tradition 
influenced by Locke (i.e., empiricist philosophy and associationist 
psychology) there is a tendency to regard relations as “unreal”, insofar 
as they are ultimately produced by the mind. Alternatively, an even 
more radical solution was occasionally put forth by associationist 
psychology: the complete elimination of relations, by considering them 
supervenient on the perception of particulars endowed with qualities. 
This reductionist initiative proceeds along the following lines: in order 
to perceive the similarity between two red spots, perceiving the two 
red spots is sufficient, making an additional perception of a relation of 
similarity between them unnecessary.1
In the final decades of the 19th century relations finally made their 
entrance into logic and ontology as fully legitimate entities. Gottlob 
Frege’s new approach to predicate calculus, based on the notions 
of function and argument and the quantifier/variable notation, had 
succeeded in putting polyadic predicates on the same level as monadic 
ones: relations could finally be treated in the same way as properties. 
This strongly contributed to eliminating the distrust of relations. 
But Frege was not alone in this venture: suffice it to remember, 
among the logicians, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Ernst Schröder.2 Bertrand Russell made his own contribution to the 
1 This attempt was made, for example, by James Mill in Analysis of the 
Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829, XIV, 2, but was criticized by John 
Stuart Mill for being too simplistic (see Editor’s [scil. John Stuart Mill’s] 
Note to the 1869 edition, vol. II, pp. 17–20).
2 Augustus De Morgan, ‘On the Syllogysm, no. IV, and on the Logic of 
Relations’, Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, X (1859), 
pp. 331–58; Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Description of a Notation for the Logic 
of Relations, resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole’s 
Calculus of Logic’, Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
N.S: IX (1873), pp. 317–78; Ernst Schröder, Algebra und Logic der Relative 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1895).
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logic of relations,3 and was especially prominent in insisting on the 
indispensability of relations. Perhaps more than anyone else, Russell 
emphasized the importance of relations from a general philosophical 
point of view, and criticized any attempt to reduce them to other 
entities. More or less in the same period relations made their triumphant 
entrance in psychology as well: in the chapter on the “Stream of 
thought” in his Principles of Psychology (New York, Henry Holt 
and Co., 1890), William James maintained that there is experience 
not only of a succession of “punctiform” and unconnected ideas, but 
also of relations, “fringes” and tendencies, and that the stream of 
consciousness is an alternation of flights and perchings.
In 20th-century philosophy we are accustomed to considering 
relations fully respectable entities, or at least as fully respectable as 
properties. British idealism, on the contrary, flourished in the context 
of a philosophical framework that both cronologically and culturally 
precedes the complete legitimation of relations. It is, therefore, interesting 
to note that relations play a central role in the philosophies of two of the 
main representatives of British idealism: T.H. Green (1836-1882) and 
F.H. Bradley (1848-1924), though, in a sense, both shared the prejudices 
against relations that were typical of their time. In fact, in a way, the 
centrality of relations in their philosophies is directly connected to such 
prejudices. It is also curious that Green’s and Bradley’s attitudes towards 
relations are opposite in many respects, though Bradley’s views were 
deeply indebted to Green’s. For Green the existence of relations is at the 
very basis of his main argument in favour of idealism, and thus relations 
are, in a sense, a “good” thing. On the contrary, Bradley is especially 
famous for an argument (the so-called “Bradley’s regress argument”) 
which, according to widespread interpretations, aims at establishing the 
impossibility of relations. This story will be examined in some detail and 
will be proven to be somewhat more tangled.
2. Thomas H. Green
Green devoted a great part of his philosophical efforts to the criticism 
and refutation of empiricism. It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that one 
of the premises of his idealistic metaphysics is a central tenet of the 
3 See for instance Bertrand Russell, ‘Sur la logique des relations avec des 
applications à la théorie des séries’, Rivista di matematica 7 (1901), 115–48. 
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empiricist (i.e., Lockean) view of relations. Green’s metaphysics – as 
is well known4 – can be summarized in three main claims:
(1) all reality lies in relations;
(2) only for a thinking consciousness do relations exist;
(3) there is one eternal consciousness, whose relating activity 
grounds all reality, and many finite consciousnesses (individual selves), 
which somehow participate in the eternal one.
Claim (3) is rather obscure and notoriously troublesome, but it does 
not concern us here. Claim (1) is advanced and argued for in almost 
all of Green’s writings: it is absolutely pervasive in his philosophical 
production. But in order to establish idealism, claim (1) must be 
accompanied by claim (2): if reality is in some way constituted by 
relations, and if relations are the product of the mind’s activity, then 
reality obviously depends on the mind’s activity. Claim (2) is also 
advanced by Green, but it is rarely argued for, at least explicitly. There 
are passages in which Green seems to realize that (2) is in need of 
arguments, even more than (1) is: ‘That ‘all reality lies in relations’ will 
more readily be admitted than that ‘only for a thinking consciousness 
do relations exist’ (Lectures on Logic, § 18, in Collected Works of T.H. 
Green, ed. by Peter Nicholson, Bristol, Thoemmes, 1997, hereinfater 
CW, vol. II, p. 179); yet, only few lines later we find that ‘at any rate 
one should think that the burden of proof lies with those who hold 
that relations exist otherwise than as we know them to exist [scil. 
only for a thinking consciousness]’ (ibid.). On the whole it seems that 
Green takes (2) for granted, and that he feels justified in doing so by 
the fact that even his philosophical opponents (among them Locke) do 
the same: (2) is thus accepted by Green on the authority of that very 
tradition which he criticizes.
Obviously enough, the empiricist tradition does not accept (1); and 
(2) alone does not entail idealism. Rather, it leads to a view according 
to which one must distinguish between:
(a) an independent reality that is given to us, with all its 
determinations, through sensations;
4 For a presentation along similar lines see W.J Mander, ‘Bradley and Green on 
Relations’, in Idealism, Metaphysics, and Community, ed. by William Sweet 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 55–67.
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(b) the operations of the mind (thinking consciousness), which 
abstracts specific determinations from the reality given to the senses, 
and then possibly recombines them in a novel way.
This is exactly the view that Green criticized in his works, through 
a profusion of (somewhat repetitive) arguments. Green points out that 
independent reality cannot contain relations, as the latter are produced 
by the mind (by hypothesis), and are thus “unreal”. Empiricists’ reality 
must therefore be made up of unrelated atoms. Yet, based on decidedly 
elementary constituents, and on a reality that is completely deprived of 
any structure, virtually none of the world’s phenomena can be accounted 
for, not even the most trivial and pervasive ones – or at least this is 
Green’s contention. For example, without the involvement of thought, 
one could not even say that there is a sensation of yellow, since the 
notion of yellow only takes on a determinate meaning by virtue of the 
relations it holds with other sensations (because it is different from red, 
for instance); and relations are – as we know – a product of the mind. 
Strictly speaking, without the involvement of thought one could not even 
say that there is a sensation, for being a sensation implies a relation to 
a sentient being. As Green asserts, ‘a consistent sensationalism must be 
speechless’ (Introduction to Hume’s “Treatise of Human Nature”, I, § 
45, in CW, vol. I, p. 36). In order to avoid such a desperate conclusion, 
the empiricist tradition often resorted to cheating, by surreptitiously 
“injecting” in the sense data something that could not be present there, 
as it is produced by the conscious activity of the mind; then, with 
a sort of sleight of hand, empiricists thought they could extract these 
“injected” elements through the process of abstraction. But, as Green 
never tired of repeating, ‘It is clear […] that it is impossible to abstract 
an idea that is not there, in real existence, to be abstracted’ (Introduction 
to Hume’s “Treatise of Human Nature”, I, § 39, in CW, vol. I, p. 31). 
Another empiricist gambit that is often criticized by Green consists in 
substituting the experience of some events related to one another with 
a series of experiences that are, in some way, connected to one another. 
The experience of a succession of events (which requires the presence of 
the relation of succession in the experienced reality) cannot be accounted 
for as a succession of experiences.5
Generally speaking, for Green the reality of a thing ultimately 
consists of its relations with other things, at least with the mind 
5 James Mill commonly employed this sort of trick: see footnote 1 above.
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that knows it: ‘A sensation can only form an object of experience 
in being determined by an intelligent subject which distinguishes 
it from itself and contemplates it in relation to other sensations’ 
(Prolegomena to Ethics, § 44, in CW, vol. IV, p. 47). If all relations 
are removed, things themselves are removed. Yet, in Green’s 
philosophy relations are not only crucial for the constitution of reality 
in this very general and comprehensive sense: they are also crucial 
in accounting for the difference between reality in a narrower sense 
(for instance, what is experienced while awake) and what is not real 
in this sense (for instance, what is experienced in dreams). For Green 
reality is constituted (produced) first and foremost by the activity of 
the eternal consciousness, and only secondarily by the activity of 
the finite individual minds (more exactly, only insofar as the latter 
participate in the former). What is vulgarly referred to as “unreal” 
is just that which does not find its place in a system of relations 
that is stable, permanent, consistent and intersubjectively available 
(as in the case of the disconnected experiences of dreams); that is 
to say, that which is only partly integrated in the all-encompassing 
and coherent system of relations that is established by the eternal 
consciousness. Such an interconnectedness among things is for 
Green the only possible criterion of reality, which is defined as ‘a 
single and unalterable system of relations’ (Prolegomena to Ethics, 
§ 21, in CW, vol. IV, p. 25).
It should be noted that the central idea of Green’s metaphysics, i.e., 
that everything is constituted by relations, and therefore is in some 
sense reducible to relations, seems to present a grave complication. 
On the one hand we have the view according to which the terms of the 
relations (as everything else) are constituted by relations themselves 
(that is, all the features of the terms depend on the relations the 
terms are in); on the other hand, it remains that relations, in order 
to be relations, need terms, as something distinct from relations. It 
would, therefore, seem that the terms cannot be reduced to relations 
without any residue, but this is inconsistent with the original view. 
In the context of Green’s philosophy, the ultimate terms of relations 
are sensations. In order to avoid the absurd conclusion that there are 
relations, but there is nothing that they relate, sensations must be 
admitted into existence independently of relations. Yet, Green often 
insisted that everything that can be said about such sensations comes 
from the fact that they are terms of relations, so that sensations, when 
considered in isolation, are “ineffable”. The entire question seems 
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rather muddled. It has been discussed several times,6 and Green 
himself was fully aware of the problem (see Prolegomena to Ethics, 
§§ 42-51, in CW, vol. IV, pp. 45-54; Lectures on Logic, § 20, CW, 
vol. II, pp. 181-182; Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant, §§ 4-5, 
in CW, vol. II, pp. 5-9). Green’s solution is not completely clear, 
but its essence is that similar objections are based on a mistaken 
view of abstraction. According to Green, while it is true that we 
can abstract terms (mere sensations) and relations from the whole 
they constitute together, this does not mean that terms and relations 
exist – or can exist – separately. Green’s answer presents some 
obvious difficulties. First of all, it does not allow for the asymmetry 
between terms and relations which is vital to Green’s philosophy. 
Interestingly enough, it is also based on a view of abstraction that 
seems to conflict with Green’s own view of it. As it has been shown, 
in criticizing the use of abstraction made by empiricists, Green held 
that it is impossible to abstract an idea that is not already there. This 
remark now acts as a boomerang against Green himself: if terms 
(mere abstractions) can be abstracted at all, this means that they 
have already been there: in other words, that they must have some 
sort of existence independent of relations.
3. Francis H. Bradley
Relations hold a central place in Green’s world, due to their 
constitutive role. On the other hand, Bradley, though indebted to Green 
in many respects, is mostly famous for an argument – the so-called 
regress argument – whose conclusion according to some interpreters 
is that relations (or at least external relations) are contradictory, and 
therefore impossible. Thus there is one British idealist philosopher for 
which relations are at the very centre of reality (and are also crucial 
in establishing idealism), and another British idealist philosopher for 
which relations (or at least external relations) seem not to exist at all. 
It is neither possible to examine Bradley’s philosophy in its entirety 
here, nor to analyze some of its aspects in detail. Rather, we shall limit 
6 See W.J. Mander, ‘In Defence of the Eternal Consciousness’, in T.H. Green. 
Ethics, Politics, and Political Philosophy, ed. by Maria Dimova-Cookson and 
W.J. Mander (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, pp. 187–206), pp. 198–200; 
Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 37–38.
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ourselves to understanding whether the aforemntioned opposition is a 
faithful picture of the two philosophers’ views, or if the story is – as 
one might suppose – more intricate.
The regress argument is put forth at different points in Bradley’s 
works, and its formulation is not always exactly the same. Yet, it might 
be summarized in the following way. Let us suppose that we must 
account for the fact that two things are in some way connected to one 
another. It is fair to assume that the analysis of this situation requires 
something more than a mere list of the two things in question, since 
the two things could well be given and their being connected could 
nevertheless not be given. At this point one could introduce a new 
element – a relation – to account for the two things being connected. 
But now we must provide an account of the fact that three elements are 
connected: the two original things and the relation. It seems that, in this 
case as well, a mere list of the three constituents is not enough, since 
the three constituents could well be given and their being connected 
could nevertheless not be given. We could be tempted to introduce 
new relations, in order to account for the connection between the 
first relation and the two things. But the same problem would clearly 
arise regardless of the number of newly added relations. We have thus 
embarked on a plainly vicious regress.
The argument is most assuredly formulated in terms of relations, 
and there is a quite obvious sense in which it amounts to a criticism of 
relations.7 Yet, the true objective of Bradley’s criticism is seemingly a 
different one; and that does not (or not only) have to do with relations 
in particular, but with the more general question of the unity of 
complexes, which transcends the particular case of relations. Several 
scholars today agree that the real issue Bradley dealt with when it came 
to his regress argument is the latter;8 furthermore, most contemporary 
7 The question of whether such a criticism concerns relations in general or only 
external relations is rather tangled, both for exegetical reasons, and because 
of the later debate on internal vs. external relations, with which Bradley’s 
argument came to be closely intertwined. Consequently, the entire question 
will be left aside. For a thorough discussion of the issue see Stewart Candlish, 
The Russell/Bradley Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth-Century 
Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
8 See, among others, Peter Hylton, ‘The Nature of the Proposition and 
the Revolt against Idealism’, in Philosophy in History. Essays on the 
Historiography of Philosophy, ed. by Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and 
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 375–
97; Kenneth Russell Olson, An Essay on Facts (Stanford: Center for the 
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philosophical debates on the regress make the same assumption.9 The 
real issue is thus the analysis of complexes (such as facts) into their 
constituents: is it possible to analyze a complex into its constituents, 
without any residue? The gist of Bradley’s regress argument is that it 
is not possible, whatever the number of constituents we are willing to 
include on the list. In other words, every analysis (conceived of in this 
way) is, in reality, a falsification. This conclusion is fully consonant 
with the holistic inclinations that are characteristic of idealism in 
general and of Bradley’s idealism in particular.
But what about relations? Do they, after all, exist in Bradley’s 
world or not? And what role to they play? As is often the case with 
Bradley – and that can be somewhat disappointing – no clear-cut and 
univocal answer is available. For Bradley relations are associated 
with the activity of thought. One could almost say that thought is 
by its very nature relational, in that it connects separate elements 
into progressively wider unities. In order to understand how this all 
works, it is helpful to focus on judgment, which is the operation of 
thought responsible for making connections. According to Bradley, 
judgment is not – as it is for the empiricist tradition – the combination 
of two ideas or representations (i.e., subject and predicate), but rather 
the attribution of a unified content (which includes both subject and 
predicate) to reality, which is the only true subject. For example: the 
judgment that the goat is white does not consist in the combination of 
the idea of goat (the subject) with that of whiteness (the predicate), but 
rather in the attribution of the complex ideal content the goat is white 
to reality; the best approximation to the real form of such a judgment 
is probably something to the effect of “Reality is such that the goat 
is white”. However, every finite judgment is valid only under some 
implicit assumptions, which concern different background features of 
the situation that are not explicitly considered. To use our previous 
example, the goat is white is true only against the background of a 
Study of Language and Information, 1987), chapter iii; Peter Hylton, Russell, 
Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy; Luigi Cimmino, Il 
cemento dell’universo. Riflessioni su F.H. Bradley (Siena: Cantagalli, 
2008), especially chapter i; Guido Bonino, ‘Bradley’s Regress: Relations, 
Exemplification, Unity’, Axiomathes 23 (2013) 189–200. For a historical 
survey of the different interpretations of Bradley’s regress argument, see 
Guido Bonino, ‘The Unity of the Proposition – The Rise of a Philosophical 
Problem’, Conceptus 39 (2010), 101–25.
9 See Guido Bonino, ‘Bradley’s Regress: Relations, Exemplification, Unity’, 
p. 190, footnote 2 for some brief bibliographical indications.
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theory of colours, according to which, say, the goat, being white, cannot 
be red. Knowledge advances as it subsumes within the judgment all the 
conditions hitherto implicit. Judgment thus increasingly expands: from 
the goat to the whole universe – through a process that is presumably 
never-ending. In other words, elements that have previously been 
separate, come to be connected together by means of relations. Such a 
process is perfectly analogous, from a structural point of view, to that 
in which consciousness establishes relations, as described by Green. It 
is clear that in Bradley’s process of unification relations are granted a 
fundamental role, not unlike that granted to them by Green.
However, Bradley’s idealism is sui generis: it does not admit the 
Hegel-like rationalism which is among Green’s characteristic traits. 
For Bradley thought is not all-powerful, and its range of application is 
limited – so to speak – in two directions: below and above. Below there 
is what Bradley refers to as “immediate feeling”. Immediate feeling 
has its own kind of inner diversity, yet it is not divided into parts (it 
is a typical instance of the idealistic identity in difference). In a way, 
immediate feeling contains the whole reality, but in an unarticulated 
form (Green would have probably called it “speechless”). In order 
to be able to operate, thought must break up immediate feeling into 
countless separate elements. Among such separate elements are also 
relations, which will then allow thought to commit to the endless 
task of putting the pieces together. But the operations of thought are 
always imperfect, as demonstrated by the contradictory nature of 
relations that is exposed by the regress argument. Thought can try to 
recreate some sort of spurious unity starting from the constituents in 
which the whole has been divided; but such a spurious unity is only 
an imperfect likeness of the original unity which can be found in the 
immediate feeling – below.
According to Bradley, there is another form of genuine unity, in 
addition to the original one: it is a sort of final unity. Thought, as has 
already been remarked, is limited above as well. It always tries to unify 
separate elements into increasingly comprehensive judgments, but this 
process cannot have an end. Even if thought succeeded in formulating 
an all-embracing judgment (in which all the implicit assumptions are 
made explicit and incorporated into the judgment itself), the latter 
would just be an attempt to identify reality with an ideal content 
(albeit the “richest” among ideal contents). But there is always a 
chasm between reality and ideal contents, if only because reality is an 
individual, whereas an ideal content is necessarily universal (as is all 
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thought).10 Beyond thought there is what Bradley calls the “Absolute”. 
Like immediate feeling, the Absolute is a unified whole, endowed with 
an inner diversity, but devoid of parts. Its unity is a non-relational 
unity, exactly like that of immediate feeling.11 It is not by chance that 
the Absolute, like immediate feeling, is ineffable: immediate feeling is 
below speech, the Absolute is above. Between the two extremes lies 
the domain of thought, and relations unquestionably belong to this 
domain.
We shall conclude this section with some comparative remarks on the 
role of relations in Green’s and Bradleys’ philosophy. Green’s relations 
perform a unifying function: they “keep the world together” and, in 
doing so, they “constitute” the world itself. For Bradley there are two 
domains, i.e., that of immediate feeling and that of the Absolute, which 
possess a peculiar kind of non-relational unity. There is nothing of this 
in Green: there is neither an infra-relational immediate feeling, nor a 
supra-relational Absolute. In the domain of thought relations perform 
a similar function in both Green and Bradley: they act as a thrust 
towards, and at the same time as a means to, unification itself. Bradley’s 
thought, on the other hand, aims at a complete unification (without 
ever being able to attain it), but at the same time it is responsible for the 
fragmentation of the whole into separate parts: in order to unify, one 
must first come into possession of the parts to be unified.
4. A final remark
If the reconstruction of Bradley’s regress argument that has been 
summarized is roughly correct, then one question might easily arise. If the 
chief problem that is addressed by Bradley’s regress argument concerns 
the unity of complexes, why is the argument itself formulated as if it 
concerned the existence or the nature of relations? After all, relational 
complexes seem to be only a special case of the more general problem 
of the unity of complexes. The same problem concerning unity could 
be raised even with respect to the case of an individual exemplifying a 
property: that this spot is yellow is indeed a complex, even if no relations 
10 At a linguistic level, the difference corresponds to that between proper names 
and definite descriptions: reality can only be referred to by a proper name, 
whereas thought can only work by means of definite descriptions.
11 One might speak of the infra-relational unity of immediate feeling and the 
supra-relational unity of the Absolute.
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at all occur. A general formulation of the problem would have certainly 
been more straightforward. Or at least that is what would seem sensible 
to us, who are accustomed to a logical and philosophical culture in which 
relations and properties are regarded as being on the same level.
The whole issue could be partly spurious, and dependent on 
terminological misunderstanding: the fact that this spot is yellow could 
also be given a relational analysis, based on the connection between an 
individual spot and the universal property yellow by means of a relation 
of exemplification. Yet there is perhaps a more interesting historical 
reason that may contribute explaining why the problem of the unity of 
complexes is formulated in terms of relations. The empiricist tradition 
was often deliberately superficial with regard to ontological/categorial 
classifications,12 but its overall inclination was certainly nominalistic. 
Due to both this superficiality and to the nominalistic tendency, the 
empiricist tradition handed down a legacy that favoured the confusion 
– or at least the lack of a clear distinction – between an individual 
exemplifying a property (i.e., a fact, and therefore a complex) and a 
bare property, conceived of (nominalistically, but implicitly) as a trope. 
Thus the complex nature of facts such as this spot is yellow could easily 
go unnoticed. For some reasons, no confusion of the sort had ever been 
made between a relational fact and a bare relation.13
It should be noted that Bradley seems to have been deeply aware 
of this whole dialectic. This is especially clear in his unfinished and 
posthumously published paper on Relations (Collected Essays, 1930). In 
this paper Bradley attempts to elaborate on his view regarding relations, 
and in this context he makes an explicit distinction between relations and 
relational situations (relational facts, as we would say). This provided 
an opportunity to deal once more with the problem of the unity of 
complexes, in a way that makes it clear that the problem itself is not 
necessarily associated with questions concerning the nature of relations, 
but is a more general one. This approach to the problem completely 
ignores the alternative between internal and external relations, which is 
regarded as relatively shallow and irrelevant with respect to the issue. 
12 For some interesting considerations on the effects of a similarly superficial 
attitude in G.E. Moore’s works, see Herbert Hochberg, Thought, Fact, and 
Reference. The Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1978), pp. 22–23.
13 This is most likely because even a convinced nominalist must recognize that 
a relational fact involves at least two individual constituents, and that makes 
it complex.
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It is also remarkable that Bradley’s reflections on the unity of 
complexes in this paper closely resemble – though formulated with 
different terminology and in a different conceptual framework – 
Bertrand Russell’s treatment of the same topic in The Principles of 
Mathematics (1903). Both philosophers were clearly dealing with the 
question of whether it is possible to account for the unity of a complex 
on the basis of its constituents. As it is widely known, their answers 
were different: it is not possible, according to Bradley; it is possible (or 
it must be possible), according to Russell. But this is beside the point. 
What is interesting here is that the real point of disagreement between 
Russell and Bradley was the question of the unity of complexes, and 
not the opposition between internal and external relations. The latter 
issue was only a bit player in the debate, notwithstanding Russell’s 
own polemical reconstruction of the debate itself. By contrast, Bernard 
Bosanquet formulated his opposition to Russell on this matter in more 
traditional terms. In the second edition of his Logic, or the Morphology 
of Knowledge (1911), Bosanquet tackled the problem by inquiring 
whether relations can be external, or must be internal (relevant, as 
Bosanquet liked to say): in other words, whether relations modify 
(or in some way constitute) their terms or not. This formulation is 
superficially more akin to the way in which Russell mostly fashioned 
the issue, but it does not reach the root of the problem.
